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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis examines how New Mexico’s state fusion center can develop a robust 
intelligence-led policing and all-hazards model for New Mexico and its rural and tribal 
communities. The research examines the principles behind intelligence-led policing and 
identifies best practices established by other local and state law enforcement 
organizations, focusing on how these practices are followed by fusion centers. Then, it 
conducts a close analysis of the New Mexico fusion center to determine, in light of best 
practices, how policies and procedures might be changed to better address rural and tribal 
concerns. A redefined intelligence and all-hazards mission, as described in this thesis, 
will provide all participating agencies with a universal definition of intelligence-led 
policing, will maintain and enhance community-policing efforts, and will establish a 
platform for contribution to the domestic intelligence cycle—fusing New Mexico’s 
four-corner region, which is essential for leveraging resources to detect and disrupt 
organized criminal organizations and terrorism. 
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Collecting and sharing information is the heart of effective intelligence-led 
policing. One mechanism for managing law enforcement intelligence is intelligence fusion 
centers, which help partners share threat information between the federal, state, tribal, and 
local levels. The House Committee on Homeland Security, for example, has called for 
greater use of fusion centers, arguing that “these State and locally owned hubs for 
information sharing and analysis serve as the connection point between front-line law 
enforcement and first responders, and the Intelligence Community.”1 Today, there are 
seventy-nine fusion centers throughout the country, located within several states and major 
urban cities.  
Although fusion centers were created after 9/11 to combat terrorism, many have 
broadened their focus to address all crimes or all hazards. The “all-hazards approach refers 
to preparedness for terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies within the 
United States.”2 This approach allows fusion centers to broaden their areas of 
responsibility beyond terrorism and related crime, to include major disasters and 
emergencies. Statistically, after all, citizens of free countries are more likely to be victims 
of violent crimes than of a terrorist attack.3 
Unlike other state fusion centers, the New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center 
(NMASIC)—which is embedded within the New Mexico Department of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management (DHSEM)—has not expanded its mission statement 
to include public safety and major criminal threats. The NMASIC’s mission is to serve as 
a “cross-jurisdictional partnership between local, state, and federal agencies—including 
                                                 
1 House Committee on Homeland Security, “Advancing The Homeland Security Information Sharing 
Environment: A Review of the National Network of Fusion Centers” (majority staff report, House 
Committee on Homeland Security, November 2017). 
2 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, “Considerations for Fusion Center and 
Emergency Operations Center Coordination: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 502,” FEMA, 
May 2010, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1828-25045-3917/cpg_502_ 
comprehensive_preparedness_guide_considerations_for_fusion_center___eoc_coordination_2010.pdf. 
3 Mike German, Thinking Like a Terrorist: Insights of a Former FBI Undercover Agent, 1st ed. 
(Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007). 
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private sectors—for the collection, analysis, and timely dissemination of terrorism 
information.”4 While cases of potential terrorism have remained consistently low, between 
2012 and 2013 New Mexico’s violent crime rate rose 6.6 percent, which was the most 
significant increase in the country.5 This spike in violence shows that the NMASIC may 
benefit from an all-hazards approach that provides analytical and intelligence support for 
criminal investigations through intelligence-led policing.  
The NMASIC serves a population of over two million, including 102 municipalities 
and 117 rural communities, which include 25 tribal communities on 122,000 square miles.6 
According to the University of New Mexico’s Bureau of Business and Economic Research, 
the state has followed the national trend of losing rural populations to urban areas but has 
kept a higher percentage of rural areas compared to the rest of the country.7 This statistical 
data indicates that, compared to other state fusion centers, the NMASIC’s area of 
responsibility is unique; therefore, its mission statement may need to reflect the 
jurisdictional diversity of rural and tribal communities in the information-sharing process. 
The NMASIC’s area of responsibility differs from most other fusion centers in another 
way: it covers a largely rural and tribal population.  
Research and practice show that intelligence fusion centers should transform to law 
enforcement needs and, more specifically, to intelligence-led policing. Furthermore, 
intelligence-led policing is no longer a concept confined to urban policing; rural and tribal 
communities could benefit from the practice. This research identifies key lessons learned 
and provides recommendations and suggestions for future research.  
 
                                                 
4 “Fusion Center,” New Mexico Department of Homeland Security & Emergency Management, 
accessed January 13, 2018, http://www.nmdhsem.org/Fusion_Center.aspx. 
5 Alexander Kent and Thomas C. Frohlich, “The Most Dangerous States in America,” USA Today, 
January 3, 2015, https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/01/03/24-7-wall-st-most-
dangerous-states/21214169/. 
6 Suzan Reagan, “Census Population Estimate Release March 2017,” Bureau of Business & Economic 
Research, April 6, 2017, http://bber.unm.edu/blog/?p=376. 
7 Suzan Reagan, “How Rural Is New Mexico?,” Bureau of Business & Economic Research, December 
9, 2016, http://bber.unm.edu/blog/?p=364. 
xv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
As I write this, I reflect on the day I received the unexpected phone call from 
Heather Issvoran saying I had been accepted into this prestigious program. Shocked, 
excited, and uncertain if it was a prank call, I eventually realized that this small-town boy 
from northern New Mexico was now one of the lucky few applicants to experience this 
life-changing journey! Thank you to the City of Santa Fe for allowing me to participate in 
this program, and a special thank you to the staff in the Santa Fe Police Department for 
enduring the weight during my absence. I would like to recognize my dear friend Steve 
Hewitt for taking me under his wing in 2014 and showing me the true meaning of 
intelligence. Without you, I wouldn’t have been prepared for this program. 
The mighty 1703/1704 Cohortians: this journey would have been impossible 
without you. Your encouragement, support, and belief in me kept me motivated and 
confident that I would reach the finish line with you. The NPS staff is superb; you created 
an atmosphere for success and facilitated an environment to absorb the knowledge each of 
you possesses. I am forever grateful to you and will cherish the opportunity you have given 
me. My advisors, specifically Dr. Erik Dahl, thank you for guiding me through this process. 
Your feedback kept me focused on my objective to better the services for my home state. 
Also, I could have never written this document without the painstaking, blunt feedback 
from my awesome writing coach, Noel Yucuis. Thank you for taking the time and for your 
patience in reviewing my work, and most importantly for your investment in seeing this 
thesis through! 
To my parents, Robert and Francella Vasquez, thank you for being the parents that 
you are. You have always been there for me in challenging and good times. You raised me 
to do my best and never give up in tough times, which is what helped get me through this 
challenging program. 
To my wonderful wife, Jolene, you are the backbone of our family and thank you 
for holding down the fort while I traveled through this journey. Working a fulltime job, 
completing your dual graduate program, and raising our two awesome boys clearly shows 
xvi 
you are the backbone of our little family! My two little guys, Gabriel and Isaiah, grab your 
fishing rods and let’s go fishing!  
And last but not least, to the small town of Penasco and Pueblo of Picuris, New 
Mexico. This thesis is dedicated to you and all the rural and tribal communities. I have seen 
what the opioid epidemic and organized crime has done to our families. I pray that this 
research helps us regain control of our communities and give our children an opportunity 




Collecting and sharing information is the heart of effective intelligence-led 
policing. As David L. Carter explains, “It is logical that each law enforcement agency must 
develop an effective mechanism to record and manage this array of information that is 
distinct from or segregated from other records in the agency’s records management 
system.”1 One such mechanism for managing law enforcement intelligence is intelligence 
fusion centers, which help partners share threat information between the federal, state, 
tribal, and local levels. The House Committee on Homeland Security, for example, has 
called for greater use of fusion centers, arguing that “these State and locally owned hubs 
for information sharing and analysis serve as the connection point between front-line law 
enforcement and first responders, and the Intelligence Community.”2 Today, there are 
seventy-nine fusion centers throughout the country, located within several states and major 
urban cities.  
Originally, fusion centers were designed after 9/11 to identify and disrupt potential 
terrorist events. However, as Mike German explains, “Citizens of free countries are victims 
of terrorism…. But they are also victims of murder, robbery, rape, and other violent crimes 
and at a much higher statistical rate.”3 In essence, citizens of free countries are statistically 
more likely to be victims of violent crimes than of a terrorist attack. Today, many fusion 
centers have broadened their focus to address all crimes or all hazards. The “all-hazards 
approach refers to preparedness for terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies 
within the United States.”4 This approach allows fusion centers to broaden their areas of 
                                                 
1 David L. Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence Operations: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal 
Law Enforcement Agencies, second ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2009), 117. 
2 House Committee on Homeland Security, “Advancing the Homeland Security Information Sharing 
Environment: A Review of the National Network of Fusion Centers” (majority staff report, House 
Committee on Homeland Security, November 2017). 
3 Mike German, Thinking Like a Terrorist: Insights of a Former FBI Undercover Agent, 1st ed. 
(Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007). 
4 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, “Considerations for Fusion Center and 
Emergency Operations Center Coordination: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 502,” FEMA, 
May 2010, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1828-25045-3917/cpg_502_ 
comprehensive_preparedness_guide_considerations_for_fusion_center___eoc_coordination_2010.pdf. 
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responsibility beyond terrorism and related crime, to include major disasters and 
emergencies.  
Unlike other state fusion centers, however, the New Mexico All Source Intelligence 
Center (NMASIC) has not expanded its mission statement to include public safety and 
major criminal threats. Embedded within the New Mexico Department of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management (DHSEM), the NMASIC’s mission is to serve as a 
“cross-jurisdictional partnership between local, state, and federal agencies-including 
private sectors for the collection, analysis, and timely dissemination of terrorism 
information.”5 Yet the NMASIC’s mission is centered primarily on terrorism and lacks an 
all-hazards approach, which includes criminal acts. While cases of potential terrorism have 
remained consistently low, between 2012 and 2013 New Mexico’s violent crime rate rose 
6.6 percent, which was the most significant increase in the country.6 This spike in violence 
shows that the NMASIC may benefit from an all-hazards approach that provides analytical 
and intelligence support for criminal investigations through intelligence-led policing.  
The NMASIC serves a population of over two million, including 102 municipalities 
and 117 rural communities, which include 25 tribal communities on 122,000 square miles.7 
According to the University of New Mexico’s Bureau of Business and Economic Research, 
the state has followed the national trend of losing rural populations to urban areas but has 
kept a higher percentage of rural areas compared to the rest of the country.8 This statistical 
data indicates that, compared to other state fusion centers, the NMASIC’s area of 
responsibility is unique; therefore, its mission statement may need to reflect the 
jurisdictional diversity of rural and tribal communities in the information-sharing process. 
                                                 
5 “Fusion Center,” New Mexico Department of Homeland Security & Emergency Management 
(DHSSEM), accessed January 13, 2018, http://www.nmdhsem.org/Fusion_Center.aspx. 
6 Alexander Kent and Thomas C. Frohlich, “The Most Dangerous States in America,” USA Today, 
January 3, 2015, https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/01/03/24-7-wall-st-most-
dangerous-states/21214169/. 
7 Suzan Reagan, “Census Population Estimate Release March 2017,” Bureau of Business & Economic 
Research, April 6, 2017, http://bber.unm.edu/blog/?p=376. 
8 Suzan Reagan, “How Rural Is New Mexico?,” Bureau of Business & Economic Research, December 
9, 2016, http://bber.unm.edu/blog/?p=364. 
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The NMASIC’s area of responsibility differs from most other fusion centers in another 
way: it covers a largely rural and tribal population.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can New Mexico implement an all-hazards, intelligence-led policing model 
for rural and tribal policing to benefit all government stakeholders? In particular, how can 
that model be applied at the NMASIC?  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review evaluates the most relevant academic literature available to 
provide a universally accepted definition of intelligence-led policing for New Mexico’s 
rural and tribal law enforcement. The material is from a variety of sources such as academic 
literature, reports from subject matter experts, professional journals, census data, the 
Department of Justice/Bureau of Justice Assistance program, and the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics.  
1. What Is Intelligence? 
Law enforcement’s use of criminal intelligence in the United States developed in 
the early 1900s. For example, criminal intelligence successfully disrupted the Black Hand 
Society, a criminal organization involved in extorting money from Italian immigrants in 
New York City during the early 1900s. As a result, fewer Italian immigrants were 
victimized and crimes involving Italian immigrants significantly decreased.9 By the end of 
the twentieth century, law enforcement accepted criminal intelligence as an effective tool 
to address organized crime.10 In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal 
Justice Standards and Goals encouraged “every law enforcement agency and every state to 
immediately establish and maintain the capability to gather and evaluate information, and 
to disseminate intelligence in a manner that protects every individual’s right to privacy 
                                                 
9 Marilyn Peterson, Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture, NCJ 210681 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, September 2005). 
10 Richard Wright et al. (eds.), Criminal Intelligence for the 21st Century: A Guide for Intelligence 
Professionals (Sacramento, CA; Richmond, VA: Law Enforcement Intelligence Units; International 
Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysis, 2011). 
4 
while it curtails organized crime and public disorder.”11 The use of criminal intelligence 
has resulted in hundreds of deportations and thousands of arrests.12  
The definition of the word intelligence has changed over the years, and has often 
been conflated with the term information.13 According to Mark Lowenthal, although 
intelligence may seem no different than information to outsiders, understanding the 
difference between the two is crucial. He categorizes information as anything that is 
already known and intelligence as information that fulfills the needs of policymakers.14 
“All intelligence is information,” he says, but “not all information is intelligence.”15 For 
information to become intelligence, it must be analyzed and vetted. Marilyn Peterson offers 
the same definition in a simple equation: “information plus analysis equals intelligence.”16 
According to Carter, law enforcement intelligence is “the product of an analytic process 
that provides an integrated perspective to disparate information about crime, crime trends, 
crime and security threats, and conditions associated with criminality.”17 Figure 1 provides 
a comparative illustration of information and intelligence. Additionally, the term is 
interpreted differently by those with operations or analysis functions. For instance, patrol 
officers believe intelligence has minimal relevance to their daily function and is viewed as 
a tool “mainly used by specialized units employing wiretaps and surveillance.”18 For 
senior police officers, however, intelligence is a valuable mechanism that supports strategic 
decision-making and investigation. Nevertheless, to criminal intelligence analysts, 
intelligence “represents a rare objective voice that understands the criminal 
environment.”19 
                                                 
11 Wright et al. 
12 Wright et al. 
13 Peterson, Intelligence-Led Policing. 
14 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, seventh ed. (Los Angeles: CQ Press, 
2017). 
15 Lowenthal. 
16 Peterson, Intelligence-Led Policing. 
17 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence, 12. 




Figure 1. Comparative Illustration of Information and Intelligence20 
Colonel Joseph R. Fuentes, Superintendent of the New Jersey State Police, provides 
a different perspective on intelligence. He identifies intelligence as “the synthesis of known 
data/information and analytical reasoning to create a determination about the overall 
operating environment.”21 Fuentes also finds that intelligence is often incorrectly used by 
law enforcement officers, who interchangeably use the terms data or information in the 
same context.22 Robert Smith supports Fuentes, recognizing intelligence as an acquired 
                                                 
20 Source: Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence, 12. 
21 Joseph R. Fuentes, “New Jersey State Police Practical Guide to Intelligence-Led Policing” (report, 
New Jersey State Police, September 2016), 44. 
22 Fuentes. 
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role for law enforcement agencies following 9/11.23 Another pioneer in the literature of 
intelligence, Brian Jackson, defines criminal intelligence “as efforts by government 
organizations to gather, assess, and act on information about individuals or organizations 
in the United States or U.S. persons elsewhere that are not related to the investigation of a 
known past criminal act or specific planned criminal activity.”24  
Despite the various interpretations, the essential definition remains the same: 
intelligence pertains to the collection of information, analysis of the collected information, 
and finally its actionable dissemination. Using this basic, functional concept, all levels of 
law enforcement ought to have an understanding of intelligence. This thesis accepts the 
simplest understanding of intelligence as defined by Lowenthal: “All intelligence is 
information, not all information is intelligence.”25 This basic understanding allows law 
enforcement personnel and leadership to collectively understand that intelligence is a 
product of evaluated, vetted, and synthesized information. Patrol officers, senior officers, 
and criminal intelligence analysts should have this same understanding, which provides the 
essential framework and applications for intelligence-led policing. 
2. Intelligence-Led Policing  
Intelligence-led policing is now broadly adopted by law enforcement agencies as a 
fundamental public safety function, but there remains ambiguity about its definition and 
essential concepts in the literature.26 For example, Carter defines it as “the collection and 
analysis of information related to crime and conditions that contribute to crime, resulting 
in an actionable intelligence product designed to assist law enforcement in developing 
tactical responses to threats and strategic planning related to emerging or changing 
                                                 
23 Robert A. Smith, “Law Enforcement Intelligence: Its Evolution and Scope Today,” Journal of U.S. 
Intelligence Studies 20, no. 3 (Spring/Summer 2014): 59–63, https://www.afio.com/publications/SMITH_ 
Robert_Law_Enforcement_Intelligence_FINAL_2014July14.pdf. 
24 Brian A. Jackson and Agnes Gereben Schaefer (eds.), The Challenge of Domestic Intelligence in a 
Free Society: A Multidisciplinary Look at the Creation of a U.S. Domestic Counterterrorism Intelligence 
Agency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009). 
25 Lowenthal, Intelligence. 
26 Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing. 
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threats.”27 Meanwhile, Jerry Ratcliff defines intelligence-led policing as “a business model 
and managerial philosophy where data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal to an 
objective decision-making framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction, 
disruption, and prevention through both strategic management and effective enforcement 
strategies that target prolific and serious offenders.”28 Although these definitions vary in 
perspective, they share the common elements of the collection, analysis, and the delivery 
of actionable intelligence. 
Intelligence-led policing emerged in the United States because of the 9/11 terrorist 
events.29 As a result, the national strategy for homeland security “required all levels of law 
enforcement to detect, deter, prevent, respond to and mitigate criminal and terrorist 
activities.”30 Adopting the framework from the British National Intelligence Model, the 
U.S. Department of Justice provides the following intelligence-led-policing, or ILP, 
framework: 
American ILP relies on analytically understanding multijurisdictional crime 
threats, developing a pathway toward solving the crime problems, and 
relying on proactive information sharing, both within the agency and 
externally with other law enforcement agencies, to maximize the number of 
law enforcement personnel who may identify indicators of threats and 
intervene.31 
Following 9/11, organizations such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police 
recommended that local, state, and tribal law enforcement agencies adopt intelligence-led 
policing.32 At the time, “ILP was envisioned as a tool for sharing information that would 
aid law enforcement agencies in identifying threats and developing responses to prevent 
                                                 
27 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence. 
28 Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing. 
29 Bureau of Justice Assistance, “Reducing Crime through Intelligence-Led Policing,” National 
Criminal Intelligence Resource Center, accessed November 16, 2018, https://www.ncirc.gov/documents/ 
public/Reducing_Crime_Through_ILP.pdf. 
30 Smith, “Law Enforcement Intelligence.” 
31 Bureau of Justice Assistance, “Reducing Crime.” 
32 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence. 
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those threats from reaching fruition in America’s communities.”33 However, intelligence-
led policing is sometimes confused with other policing strategies, such as Compstat and 
problem-oriented policing.34 And since the intelligence-led policing concept was adopted 
in American policing, the methodology has become a buzzword.35  
As further explained by Richard Wright, “the primary aim of intelligence-led 
policing is the prevention of crime and arrest of prolific offenders, and it seeks a more 
objective decision-making system based on data and intelligence analysis to determine 
priorities.”36 The key component in American intelligence-led policing is information 
sharing. Sharing information within an agency and externally with law enforcement 
partners is essential for detection, prevention, and response to criminal and terrorist threats. 
Furthermore, intelligence-led policing has promoted innovation, allowing law enforcement 
leadership to supplement traditional community-policing services with innovative 
applications.37 The use of technological solutions―such as cell phone analysis, social 
media covert operations, surveillance cameras, and global positioning devices―has 
allowed law enforcement to target individuals and organizations proactively. The mixture 
of innovative investigative strategies and information sharing allows police to adapt to 
modern threats.  
3. Role of Intelligence Fusion Centers  
The fusion center concept began in the major urban area jurisdictions of Arizona, 
Georgia, New York, and Los Angeles with efforts to “fill the void of combining 
information and intelligence sources at the local level to ferret out terrorist activity, thereby 
underpinning a national effort to share information that could be used in overall 
                                                 
33 Carter. 
34 Wright et al., Criminal Intelligence for the 21st Century. 
35 Jerry Ratcliffe, “Intelligence-Led Policing and the Problems of Turning Rhetoric into Practice,” 
Policing and Society 12, no. 1 (2002): 53–66. 
36 Wright et al., Criminal Intelligence for the 21st Century. 
37 Bureau of Justice Assistance, “Reducing Crime.” 
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preparedness efforts.”38 Currently, there are several fusion centers serving the local, state, 
and regional “information sharing and analytic function” efforts.39 As of January 2013, 
there were well over seventy fusion centers, which include twenty-six major urban area 
fusion centers and fifty-three state fusion centers.40 On December 11, 2018, the 
Department of Homeland Security State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative 
reiterated the Presidential Guideline 2 Report about the common framework for fusion 
centers, stating that fusion centers take the following responsibilities:  
1. Share information to address national security and criminal investigations 
in a manner that protects privacy, civil liberties, and other legal rights of 
individuals protected by United States law, while ensuring the security of 
the information shared. 
2. Foster a culture of fusing “all crimes with national security implications” 
with “all hazards” information in order to capture criminal activity that 
may be a precursor to a terrorist plot. 
3. Support efforts to detect and prevent terrorist attacks by maintaining 
situational awareness of threats, alerts, and warnings. 
4. Develop critical infrastructure protection plans to ensure the security and 
resiliency of infrastructure operations. 
5. Prioritize emergency management, response, and recovery planning 
activities based on likely threat scenarios and at-risk targets. 
6. Determine the allocation of funding, capabilities, and other resources.  
7. Develop training, awareness, and exercise programs.41 
 
                                                 
38 Justin Lewis Abold, Ray Guidetti, and Douglas Keyer, “Strengthening the Value of the National 
Network of Fusion Centers by Leveraging Specialization: Defining ‘Centers of Analytical Excellence,’” 
Homeland Security Affairs 8, article 7 (June 2012), https://www.hsaj.org/articles/223. 
39 House Committee on Homeland Security, “National Network of Fusion Centers” (majority staff 
report, House Committee on Homeland Security, July 2013). 
40 House Committee on Homeland Security. 
41 Department of Homeland Security, “Privacy Impact Assessment for the Department of Homeland 
Security State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative” (assessment, Department of Homeland 
Security, 2008). 
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It is commonly expressed by fusion center critics that all fusion centers are similar; 
if you have seen one, you have seen them all. However, as explained in the Homeland 
Security Affairs Journal, “While it remains important that fusion centers maintain uniform 
baseline capabilities, today there is a renewed interest in acknowledging the value 
individual fusion centers can provide with unique expertise and specializations.”42 The 
American Civil Liberties Union also acknowledges that it is difficult to generalize fusion 
centers because “no two fusion centers are alike.”43 However, “Each fusion center is 
responsible for determining who within their area of responsibility (AOR) requires 
information and intelligence products that address threat and risk related to crime, counter-
terrorism, and homeland security.”44 Also, as depicted in Figure 2, the fusion center 
baseline capabilities are defined by two sections: fusion process capabilities and 
management, and administrative capabilities. The former outlines the standards for the 
fusion center’s intelligence process and the latter enables its functional concept.45 
Chapter III of this thesis will highlight the importance of the intelligence cycle process for 
local, state, tribal, and federal partners.  
                                                 
42 Abold, Guidetti, and Keyer, “Strengthening the Value of the National Network of Fusion Centers.” 
43 Michael German and Jay Stanley, What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers? (New York: American Civil 
Liberties Union, 2007), https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf. 
44 Abold, Guidetti, and Keyer, “Strengthening the Value of the National Network of Fusion Centers.” 
45 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, “Baseline Capabilities for State and 
Major Urban Area Fusion Centers” (supplement, Department of Homeland Security, September 2008). 
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Figure 2. Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities46 
There remain questions about the role and integrity of fusion centers. A report from 
the House Committee on Homeland Security in 2017 stresses new challenges that could 
affect the fusion center’s ability to assess and share threat information.47 Some of those 
challenges include the social media policies restricting fusion centers from valuable data, 
and the restriction of some local and state law enforcement agencies from collaborating 
with federal partners.48 Furthermore, the report also recommends that the Department of 
Homeland Security and Department of Justice collaborate with the national network to 
review and update fusion center guidelines and capabilities to “accurately reflect the threat 
environment and promote … continued growth.”49 
Lastly, the fusion center’s core function involves outreach and information sharing 
with local, state, and tribal stakeholders within the center’s area of responsibility. 
                                                 
46 Adapted from Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice. 
47 House Homeland Security Committee, “Advancing the Information Sharing Environment.” 
48 House Homeland Security Committee. 
49 House Homeland Security Committee. 
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Nevertheless, it is difficult for fusion centers to establish and maintain direct contact with 
individuals from many jurisdictions.50 Therefore, state fusion centers have developed a 
liaison officer program to facilitate the information-sharing process.51 This program is 
explored in Chapter IV, which outlines the function and benefits of a liaison officer 
program as seen in the NMASIC.  
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis examines the principles of intelligence-led policing and determines best 
practices as they have been established by other local and state law enforcement 
organizations, focusing on how these practices are followed by fusion centers. Then, it 
conducts a close analysis of the New Mexico fusion center to determine, in light of best 
practices, how policies and procedures might be changed to better address rural and tribal 
concerns.  
D. ARGUMENT 
To develop a robust intelligence-led policing model, this thesis argues that New 
Mexico must adopt all-hazards and intelligence-led policing strategies to incorporate rural 
and tribal communities into the information-sharing process. The reorganization of the 
NMASIC will enhance the New Mexico network, which is essential for leveraging 
resources to detect and disrupt organized criminal organizations and terrorism. With a 
redefined NMASIC mission, all participating agencies will have a universal intelligence-
led policing definition, maintain and enhance community-policing efforts, and establish a 
platform for contribution to the domestic intelligence cycle, essentially fusing New 
Mexico’s four-corner region. 
                                                 
50 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, Establishing a Fusion Center Liaison 
Officer Program: A Guide and Workbook of Planning and Development Considerations (Vienna, VA: 
Lafayette Group, October 2009). 
51 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice. 
13 
E. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Following this introduction, Chapter II examines the New Mexico intelligence 
system and its challenges. Chapter III highlights the key intelligence functions with a 
review of the intelligence recommendations provided by the Department of Justice and 
experts cited in the literature review, a review of the liaison officer programs, and a look 
at the United Kingdom’s MI5 intelligence model. Chapter IV is an analysis of U.S. local 
intelligence best practices, specifically the El Paso, Texas, Multi-Agency Tactical 
Response Information Exchange (MATRIX), the New Jersey Regional Operations and 
Intelligence Center Task Force, and the Santa Fe Police Department’s Criminal 
Intelligence and Analysis Center. Finally, Chapter V identifies key lessons learned and 
provides recommendations and suggestions for future research.  
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II. THE NEW MEXICO INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AND ITS 
CHALLENGES 
In 2003, in the aftermath of 9/11, the New Mexico Office of Homeland Security 
was created and began working with the Office of Emergency Management. In 2007, the 
New Mexico legislature joined the two offices, essentially creating the Department of 
Homeland Security and Emergency Management (DHSEM). Today, the DHSEM is the 
state’s primary organization for responding to emergencies and disasters.52 The New 
Mexico All Source Intelligence Center (NMASIC), the state fusion center, falls under 
DHSEM and incorporates an all-hazards approach. However, unlike other fusion 
intelligence centers, the NMASIC lacks an effective and efficient law enforcement 
authority to fulfill an all-hazards model. This chapter first provides an in-depth review of 
the NMASIC’s operational policies and procedures from the author’s professional 
observations as the NMASIC intelligence liaison officer coordinator. Then, it reviews the 
intelligence system within the NMASIC and the New Mexico State Police (NMSP), 
particularly the problems.  
A. THE NEW MEXICO ALL SOURCE INTELLIGENCE CENTER  
The intelligence cycle is the core of the NMASIC’s function and it has five essential 
components: collecting, analyzing, collating, disseminating, and reevaluating information. 
Of the five intelligence-cycle components, collection has been the most difficult. The 
NMASIC uses a variety of data sources; it does not rely on a single source for information 
collection. Similar to other state and major fusion centers, the NMASIC gathers tips and 
leads from the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, as well as from local, 
state, and federal entities, the private sector, and the public safety and public health sectors. 
For standard information collection, the NMASIC uses two forms: requests for information 
(RFIs) and requests for product (RFPs). An RFI is a specific source to help “narrow the 
intelligence gaps for threat assessments, criminal investigations and other tactical and 
                                                 
52 “New Mexico Department of Homeland Security & Emergency Management, accessed July 12, 
2018, http://www.nmdhsem.org/. 
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strategic intelligence products,” and RFPs are intelligence product requests from other 
organizations.53  
At the time of its implementation in 2017, New Mexico Statute Chapter 9, Article 
28, classified DHSEM as a criminal justice–law enforcement agency with the objectives 
to:  
(1) consolidate and coordinate homeland security and emergency 
management functions to provide comprehensive and coordinated 
preparedness, mitigation, prevention, protection, response and recovery for 
emergencies and disasters, regardless of cause, and acts or threats of 
terrorism; 
(2) act as the central primary coordinating agency for the state and its 
political subdivisions in response to emergencies, disasters and acts or 
threats of terrorism; and 
(3) act as the conduit for federal assistance and cooperation in response to 
emergencies, disasters and acts or threats of terrorism.54  
The statute continues: 
B. The department shall be considered a criminal justice law enforcement 
agency in order to accomplish the purposes provided in Subsection A of this 
section.55  
Although DHSEM is classified as a law enforcement agency and given statutory authority, 
the personnel assigned to the DHSEM do not have authority to act as law enforcement 
officers; for instance, they cannot obtain court-ordered arrest and search warrants. 
Additionally, this statutory authority is specific to disasters and threats of terrorism only; 
it does not give DHSEM—or therefore the NMASIC—authority in the criminal realm.  
This statutory clause has been at the center of debate between the law enforcement 
community and DHSEM personnel. Despite the DHSEM’s statutory authority, New 
                                                 
53 New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center (NMASIC), “New Mexico All Source Intelligence 
Center Operations Manual” (manual, New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center, July 2014). 
54 NM Stat § 9–28-2 (2017), https://law.justia.com/codes/new-mexico/2017/chapter-9/article-28/
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Mexico’s local, state, and tribal law enforcement organizations have been hesitant to share 
law enforcement–sensitive information or information about ongoing criminal 
investigations with the DHSEM. Most agency partners do not recognize the DHSEM as an 
equivalent law enforcement agency. As such, DHSEM personnel have repeatedly been 
refused assistance with RFIs—including simple requests such as a driver’s license check. 
Therefore, DHSEM personnel rely on the assistance of the few law enforcement personnel 
who are willing to share information or contribute to the fusion center’s mission. 
Compounding the problem is a contradicting section within the NMASIC’s 
operational manual that lists informants and citizen sources as a form of information 
collection: unlike its local law enforcement partners, the NMASIC does not have the law 
enforcement authority to manage informants or citizen sources. Without this human 
intelligence component, the NMASIC has limited ability to collect valuable information, 
which increases its dependence on law enforcement organizations that do have this 
capability.  
Like most intelligence centers, the NMASIC uses the intelligence cycle “to extract 
structured and unstructured data from multiple sources, perform synthesis, fusion, and 
analysis on this data, and disseminate the processed critical information (or intelligence) to 
decision-makers in support of their tactical, operational and strategic planning.”56 The 
NMASIC’s intelligence network structure incorporates two vital components in support of 
its intelligence liaison officer (ILO) program: the executive advisory board—made up of 
local, state, and tribal leaders—and the intelligence-working group—which consists of 
mid-level management and first-line supervisors from the ILO agency.57 The NMASIC’s 
ILO framework is an effort to fulfill the House Committee on Homeland Security 
Committee’s recommendation, which states that the National Fusion Center Association 
“should work with fusion centers to continue to expand their outreach efforts to 
stakeholders outside of law enforcement, tailor their trainings and outreach to specific 
sectors targeted, and proactively find ways to continue engagement with TLOs, and similar 
                                                 
56 NMASIC, “Operations Manual.” 
57 NMASIC. 
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partners, after initial training.”58 However, a majority of the NMASIC’s ILOs represent 
federal partners as well as medium-sized law enforcement agencies located in New 
Mexico’s urban centers. Law enforcement agencies within rural and tribal communities do 
not fully engage in the ILO program. While the NMASIC successfully incorporated eighty 
ILOs in 2015, only one of approximately twenty-three tribal law enforcement agencies 
contributes to the program.  
For the NMASIC, email and the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) 
both serve as portals of communication with New Mexico ILOs. In December 2002, a 
collaborative law enforcement group instituted a database called the Joint Regional 
Information Exchange System; in 2004 it was transferred to the Department of Homeland 
Security and renamed HSIN. HSIN is designed to share sensitive but unclassified 
information with agencies across the local, state, tribal, and private-sector levels.59 In 
addition, HSIN unites people, processes, and technologies needed for mission success; 
many communities rely on its information for day-to-day operations, domestic and 
international events, critical incident management, disaster planning and response, and 
public safety.60 By allowing all participating organizations to collaborate and share 
information, the HSIN database has been useful for catastrophic events, such as the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill in May 2010, and major public events, such as presidential 
inaugurations and the Super Bowl.61 Although HSIN is designed to unite people from 
various law enforcement agencies and private-sector partners, not all law enforcement 
agencies access or contribute to HSIN as designed.  
As the Department of Homeland Security noted in 2016, local law enforcement 
account for 34 percent of HSIN users; federal organizations account for 29 percent, state 
                                                 
58 House Committee on Homeland Security, “Advancing Information Sharing.” 
59 “What Is HSIN?,” Department of Homeland Security, July 6, 2009, https://www.dhs.gov/what-hsin. 
60 “HSIN Basics,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed December 13, 2017, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/HSIN-Fact-Sheet-HSIN-Basics.pdf.  
61 “2016 Annual Report: Delivering Mission Success,” Homeland Security Information Network, 
accessed November 21, 2018, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/HSIN-2016%20Annual 
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organizations for 18 percent, and the private sector for 15 percent.62 HSIN claims to 
provide tribal communities an opportunity to overcome geographic and communication 
challenges, but tribal partners make up only 0.5 percent of users, as shown in Figure 3.63  
 
Figure 3. HSIN 2016 Annual Report Organization Activity64 
New Mexico’s HSIN membership allows users to access the state’s ILO program 
and law enforcement portals, which provide information on border security, cyber threats, 
domestic terrorism/extremism, international terrorism/extremism, gangs, general crime, 
and organized/transnational crime.65 The NMASIC routinely updates the HSIN law 
enforcement portal, but the ILO portal is underutilized; its information was not updated 
between July 2015 and June 2017.66 HSIN was designed for information sharing, but the 
NMASIC HSIN portal lacks a state information-sharing database equivalent to the state 
police’s Criminal Justice Information System, which is a robust information collection and 
sharing database. DHSEM does not have access to this state database, however, because 
                                                 
62 Homeland Security Information Network. 
63 Homeland Security Information Network. 
64 Adapted from Homeland Security Information Network. 
65 Homeland Security Information Network, accessed March 28, 2018, https://auth.dhs.gov. 
66 Homeland Security Information Network. 
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the state police department does not recognize DHSEM as a law enforcement agency; 
without such a recognition, DHSEM is not authorized to obtain the law enforcement–
sensitive information contained within this database. 
The ILO program does effectively collect information from multiple jurisdictions, 
such as rural and tribal communities, but only when the law enforcement agencies from 
those communities choose to participate in the process. New Mexico is plagued with 
various forms of crime that affect all communities and, as General Stanley McChrystal 
says, “it takes a network to defeat a network.”67 Although an effective ILO program may 
help target criminal networks, the NMASIC has failed to fulfill this vital fusion center 
concept due to poor cooperation and acceptance from the wider law enforcement 
community.  
To engage with its law enforcement partners, NMASIC created a “core product 
line” to enhance situational awareness across agencies.68 The product line includes risk 
assessments, special event/threat assessments, intelligence bulletins, priority bulletins, 
weekly executive summaries, joint products, reference aids, and suspicious activity 
reporting analysis. Unfortunately, the NMASIC lacks the capability to provide actionable 
intelligence products to local, state, and tribal law enforcement. Also, the NMASIC 
employs a twenty-four-hour emergency schedule to support national, state, or regional 
emergencies, should they occur; however, this schedule lacks the functional capability of 
a watch center, as explored in Chapter IV.69  
B. NEW MEXICO STATE POLICE 
The New Mexico State Police (NMSP) has changed its mission and law 
enforcement services since its incorporation. In 1935, the New Mexico Motor Patrol was 
rebranded as the New Mexico State Police and given peace officer authority to enforce all 
state laws. To the state, NMSP created twelve districts and assigned one commanding 
                                                 
67 Stanley McChrystal, Team of Teams (London: Penguin, 2015), 84. 
68 NMASIC, “Operations Manual.” 
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officer to each district to manage day-to-day operations. Moreover, the NMSP may cross 
jurisdictions with tribal territory in criminal cases because of recognized “cross 
deputization agreements.”70 NMSP shares this understanding with the Navajo Region, 
which is policed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), which covers Utah, Colorado, a 
majority of Arizona, and New Mexico. However, no intelligence component supports the 
Navajo Region or connects any of the twelve tribal regions.  
NMSP’s jurisdiction expands beyond the state and tribal territories as well; an 
NMSP representative serves as a coordinator for the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force. In 
comparison to other New Mexico law enforcement agencies, the NMSP is thus positioned 
to collaborate with all levels of government.  
Within NMSP, intelligence and analysis is the responsibility of the Criminal 
Investigations Bureau. The following is a breakdown of the NMSP analysis and 
intelligence collection function:  
ANALYSIS 
Crime Analysis Unit (CAU)—Conducts detailed research to identify crime 
trends activity distribution, effectiveness of in-progress or proposed 
enforcement strategies, legislative impact studies, and special projects as 
required. 
Strategic Analysis—Analysis involving in-depth research of long-term 
crime trends, which assist in generating projections of increases or 
decreases in crime. Examples include proactive criminal threat assessments 
and predicting trends and patterns of current and future criminal activity. 
Tactical Analysis—Analysis that assists immediate law enforcement needs 
and supports short-range purposes, usually conducted in support of a 
specific criminal investigation, i.e., link analysis, financial analysis, 
telephone toll analysis, etc.71 
 
                                                 
70 “Tribal Law Enforcement,” Bureau of Justice Statistics, accessed September 27, 2017, 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=75. 
71 New Mexico Department of Public Safety, “Analytical Services,” Policy Number OPR:11 (internal 
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INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION 
Criminal Intelligence—Information compiled, analyzed and/or 
disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor criminal activity. 
Strategic Intelligence—Information concerning existing patterns or 
emerging trends of criminal activity designed to assist in criminal 
apprehension and crime control strategies, for both short- and long-term 
investigative goals. 
Tactical Intelligence—Information regarding a specific criminal event that 
can be used immediately by operational units to further a criminal 
investigation, plan tactical operations and provide for officer/public 
safety.72 
These processes are designed to effectively and efficiently address criminal trends and 
criminal activity within the state, but NMSP lacks a critical infrastructure component like 
DHSEM’s. Also, NMSP does not operate a state fusion center; instead, the operational 
units submit their intelligence reports to the Criminal Justice Information System database 
and, if necessary, to the NMASIC.73  
Herein lies the problem with the New Mexico intelligence function. DHSEM, 
which facilitates the NMASIC, is exceptionally capable in responding to potential threats 
to the state’s critical infrastructure but lacks the ability to address organized crime and 
threats of terrorism. Law enforcement agencies who choose to share information with the 
NMASIC only when necessary are steering the state blindly in addressing the crimes and 
threats affecting local, state, and tribal communities.  
The NMSP has three regional communication centers throughout the state, in Las 
Vegas, Las Cruces, and Albuquerque, and more than 100 staff members. Each of the 
centers has the ability to provide communication channels for local, state, and federal 
entities with public safety services, which include law enforcement, emergency 
                                                 
72 New Mexico Department of Public Safety, “Intelligence Collection,” Policy Number OPR:02 
(internal document, New Mexico Department of Public Safety, February 24, 2011). 
73 New Mexico Department of Public Safety. 
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management, and fire services.74 However, NMSP regional communication centers lack 
abilities seen in the other intelligence centers, such as “maintaining situation awareness of 
events locally and throughout the world; completing time-sensitive requests from vetted 
partners; and, coordinating the dissemination of information.”75 Realigning NMSP 
regional communication centers may enhance current analysis abilities and, most 
advantageously, enhance asset management around the state to address all hazards and all 
threats. Furthermore, realignment would effectively allocate NMSP assets and resources, 
allowing leadership to deploy readily available resources in the event of an emergency or 
to address criminal activity.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Since 2003, New Mexico has attempted to incorporate an intelligence component 
for local, state, and tribal law enforcement by creating the NMASIC. The NMASIC has 
initiated an ILO program as a tool for outreach to law enforcement agencies and has utilized 
the HSIN database as a platform for information sharing. However, these two approaches 
have been unsuccessful and the fusion center’s core mission remains unfulfilled. The 
highlight of this chapter is the importance of information sharing. Like several New 
Mexico law enforcement agencies, the NMSP submits its intelligence reports to the 
NMASIC “if necessary.”76 Carter et al. argue, however, that “state, local, and tribal law 
enforcement agencies play a critical role in securing the homeland, and understanding and 
improving the intelligence practices of these agencies will enhance public safety.”77 
Analysis and intelligence collection are an unrealized gold mine for NMSP. With access 
to tribal communities through tribal jurisdiction agreements and a critical role in the FBI 
Joint Terrorism Task Force, NMSP is in a position to receive and disseminate information 
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across all levels of government and fulfill the critical role of a state intelligence center. The 
following chapter explores the key functions of an intelligence center, with an emphasis on 
the intelligence cycle components, the liaison officer program, and the United Kingdom’s 
intelligence model.  
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III. KEY INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS  
In 2003, the U.S. Department of Justice released the “National Criminal 
Intelligence Sharing Plan,” which encourages all law enforcement agencies to have an 
intelligence capability.78 Although agencies would likely agree that working together is a 
force multiplier for detecting, disrupting, and dismantling criminal and terrorist 
organizations, not all agencies have the budgets or resources to create an intelligence 
function. Many law enforcement agencies that cannot implement such a component choose 
to participate in fusion center liaison officer programs, which allow participating agencies 
to contribute information from their local jurisdictions and, in return, receive information 
from the intelligence center that affects their areas of responsibility.  
Although each intelligence center applies the intelligence cycle differently, the core 
of each model, as shown in Figure 4, consists of planning for, collecting, processing, 
analyzing, disseminating, and reevaluating actionable intelligence. Carter defines the 
intelligence cycle as “a systemic, scientific, and logical methodology to comprehensively 
process information to ensure that the most accurate, actionable intelligence is produced 
and disseminated to the people who provide an operational response to prevent a criminal 
threat from reaching fruition.”79 This process allows decision makers and investigative 
staff to collaborate and address criminal threats. A local intelligence system must 
accomplish several key functions: apply the intelligence cycle, use liaison officers and 
other methods to reach out to constituents and stakeholders, use intelligence-led policing, 
and follow an all-hazards model. This chapter identifies the key functions of an intelligence 
center and examines the recommendations from the Department of Justice and intelligence 
experts cited in the literature review. The chapter also examines the United Kingdom’s 
MI5 intelligence model for useful concepts.  
                                                 
78 Department of Justice, “The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan: Solutions and 
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Figure 4. Intelligence Cycle80 
A. INTELLIGENCE CYCLE COMPONENTS  
1. Planning and Direction/Requirements  
Law enforcement agencies in the United States have varied missions and 
intelligence needs based on their jurisdictions. Local, state, and tribal police departments 
exercise traditional community-oriented policing services, conduct patrols, and carry out 
criminal investigations, while other law enforcement agencies, such as the NMSP, enforce 
traffic laws to promote vehicle and pedestrian safety. Federal law enforcement 
organizations such as the FBI primarily conduct criminal investigations. Intelligence 
centers use risk assessment to identify and prioritize threats, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences; law enforcement, however, typically uses a targeting intelligence approach 
to identify individuals and groups involved in criminal activity. The fusion center risk-
assessment model is a functional concept for an all-hazards and all-crimes application, 
which means fusion centers incorporate all potential threats that may affect their areas of 
responsibility. Such a model is not effective for law enforcement organizations which need 
                                                 
80 Adapted from: Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, “Baseline 
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a more aggressive approach to deal with criminal organizations. The targeting intelligence 
methodology, shown in Figure 5, provides leadership with multiple options for addressing 
criminal activity. As Frank Root explains, the targeting method is “the process of 
developing and selecting criminal and criminally related targets in response to the mission 
manager’s guidance and the law enforcement mission objectives.”81 Targeting splits the 
criminals’ activities into manageable challenges for law enforcement.82 A blend of both 
models—risk assessment and targeting—benefits all levels of law enforcement and fulfills 
the fusion center’s functional concept. 
 
Figure 5. Targeting Intelligence83 
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2. Collection  
Law enforcement collects information from a variety of sources, which include, to 
name a few, daily observations, surveillance, victim/witness statements, electronic 
databases, cell phone analysis, confidential sources, and informants. Michael Bazzell 
explains that information may be obtained through a search warrant or through publicly 
available (open-source) options; the information is “collected, exploited and timelessly 
disseminated to an appropriate audience to address a specific intelligence requirement.”84 
During a narcotics investigation, for example, a detective may obtain a search warrant for 
a cell phone to collect information and develop leads, and then send the information to a 
criminal intelligence analyst, who examines the data and provides a social networking 
analysis. An example of open-source information—accessible to anyone—is postings on 
social media sites; accessing this information does not infringe on a U.S. citizen’s 
constitutional right to protection from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.  
Law enforcement is prohibited from collecting information from or on individuals 
unless probable cause has been established. Brian Jackson and Agnes Schaefer suggest that 
intelligence designs, policies, and capabilities require an understanding of the types of 
information that may be collected and how the information may be used.85 For example, 
they explain that the role of personal information depends on the investigative method: 
Specific: A person of interest is identified, and information is sought on that 
individual. The information may include personal information about other 
people—e.g., the people he or she knows…. 
Relational: A person of interest is identified. Information is then sought on 
those who may have a connection with that person…. 
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General: This methodology is based on the assumption that potential 
terrorism suspects can be identified by dint [the mark] of the unique pattern 
of transactions in which they engage.86  
Bound by the Constitution and challenged by technological advancements, law 
enforcement specifically identifies the targets and their networks to effectively apply 
investigative efforts with minimal resources. The connection of individuals and businesses 
allows personnel to explore all available investigative avenues.  
3. Processing  
Before information can be analyzed, it must go through a vetting process. 
Processing is the function of separating relevant from irrelevant data and then labeling 
relevant data within a usable system.87 As explained by Carter, the intelligence process 
has four essential components: reliability, validity, method, and deconfliction. The 
reliability and validity of the source of information are essential for determining 
appropriate investigative and operational planning. For example, if a confidential 
informant provides information on an individual who is involved in drug trafficking, the 
investigating officer must determine the reliability and validity of the source’s information, 
which requires corroborating information through other means, such as surveillance. If the 
source of information is unreliable, the information may be inadmissible in prosecutorial 
proceedings and jeopardize investigative efforts. The failure to deconflict information may 
jeopardize ongoing investigations for law enforcement organizations, may duplicate effort, 
and, most importantly, may lead to unattended consequences for officers.  
4. Analysis  
There is no question that adequate analysis is the key to effective intelligence. As 
previously defined, information must be analyzed to become intelligence.88 Therefore, 
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practitioners must make every effort to confirm that unprocessed information meets quality 
standards. In other words, the reliability and validity of the collected information determine 
the quality of analysis.89 Analyzing raw information is not an easy task; it requires the 
expertise of a qualified intelligence analyst. Intelligence analysts contribute to the unit by 
guiding investigators into untouched areas routinely unnoticed by traditional law 
enforcement efforts.90  
Intelligence officers also collect and analyze information. Most intelligence officers 
are sworn personnel who have already gained valuable experience in the traditional 
policing model.91 However, the way the U.S. Department of Homeland Security uses 
intelligence offers differs from their use in law enforcement. The Department of Homeland 
Security intelligence officers partner with state and major urban fusion centers for two 
essential purposes: to facilitate the “Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area 
Fusion Centers” and to manage the intelligence cycle within their area of responsibility by 
sharing information between local, state, tribal, and federal partners.92 Law enforcement 
intelligence officers also manage the intelligence cycle in their jurisdictions, but unlike 
Department of Homeland Security officers, they have the authority to petition the courts 
for search and arrest warrants to further their investigative objectives.  
5. Dissemination/Action  
The final stage of the intelligence cycle is providing actionable intelligence to those 
with a right and need to know. This process balances the sharing of information and the 
withholding of intelligence. If intelligence is inadvertently released, it could be detrimental 
to an investigation.93 Actionable intelligence is based on two fundamental applications, 
tactical intelligence and strategic intelligence. Wright et al. describe tactical intelligence as 
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collected and analyzed information, which includes an individual’s name, address, 
affiliates, or any other personal information.94 “This tactical intelligence is produced on 
an ongoing basis and should be readily available as an effective and valuable resource for 
investigators working on criminal investigations.”95 Vetted, analyzed information is 
valuable for active criminal investigations. For example, accurate information about a 
witness, a suspect, and the suspect’s vehicle may help a homicide detective develop leads 
or corroborate evidence. Strategic intelligence, on the other hand, is designed to provide a 
bigger picture about current criminal activity/threats and long-term planning. Wright et al. 
explain, “Strategic intelligence provides a broader view of the abilities, strengths, 
weaknesses, and trends of criminal enterprises.”96 Strategic intelligence gives decision-
makers options for addressing potential threats.  
Information may be disseminated through rapid intelligence, a new concept within 
law enforcement. Rapid intelligence is the use of technological solutions and intelligence 
resources to support and parallel the criminal investigation. The Santa Fe Police 
Department’s Criminal Investigations Division applies this methodology to high-profile 
investigations such as homicides and kidnappings. For example, in a homicide 
investigation, detectives arrive on the scene and conduct a traditional criminal investigation 
by completing a walkthrough, interviewing witnesses, and collecting evidence. 
Meanwhile, intelligence personnel perform cell tower dumps, cell phone analysis, 
computer analysis, social media searches, and other technological analysis.  
6. Feedback/Reevaluation 
Feedback and reevaluation comprise the final step in the intelligence cycle. This 
final process updates the threat, identifies vulnerabilities and consequences, and assesses 
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the effectiveness of disseminated intelligence.97 According to the Department of Justice’s 
“Fusion Center Guidelines,” the 
reevaluation assesses current and new information, assists in developing an 
awareness of possible weak areas as well as potential threats, and strives to 
eliminate previously identified weaknesses that have been hardened as a 
result of the fusion center process. Overall, this step provides an opportunity 
to review the performance or effectiveness of the fusion center’s 
intelligence function.98 
Essentially, for intelligence analysts or law enforcement leadership to effectively target a 
criminal organization or disrupt criminal activity, the intelligence product and investigative 
results must be evaluated to measure the success of applied resources and investigative 
efforts.  
B. U.S. LIAISON OFFICER PROGRAM  
It is difficult for fusion centers to establish and maintain direct contact with 
individuals from multiple jurisdictions. Therefore, state fusion centers have developed a 
liaison officer program to facilitate the information-sharing process to connect with law 
enforcement agencies and other organizational partners.99 In Establishing a Fusion Center 
Liaison Officer Program, the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice 
identify the following benefits: 
• Improving the quality and efficiency of information exchange between the 
fusion center and outside agencies 
• Increasing awareness of terrorism and criminal indicators, in accordance 
with applicable privacy and civil rights/civil liberties (CRCL) protections 
• Expanding awareness of the intelligence cycle and its underpinnings 
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• Increasing opportunities to detect, deter, and prevent crime and terrorist 
threats 
• Increasing participation in fusion center activities, specifically for non-law 
enforcement partners or smaller agencies 
• Developing a cadre of subject-matter experts (SME) 
• Augmenting the capabilities of the fusion center by providing the 
opportunity to allow real-time Intelligence and information exchange 
during incidents and on-scene response. 
• Strengthen[ing] and enhanc[ing] community oriented policing efforts.100 
Although there are several benefits of a liaison officer program, the programs are 
not consistently implemented and receive minimal direction from national fusion center 
leadership; instead, individual fusion centers tend to select a model that fulfills their basic 
functions.101 Also, a 2017 study conducted by the House Committee on Homeland 
Security showed that the range of liaison officers varied from twenty active members in 
one fusion center to 11,000 liaison officers in another.102 The terminology used for liaison 
officer programs also differs among fusion centers; some personnel are referred to as fusion 
liaison officers, others terrorism liaison officers, intelligence liaison officers, field 
intelligence officers, and so on. As previously discussed, NMASIC has an intelligence 
liaison officer (ILO) program to establish and maintain communication with local, state, 
and tribal law enforcement.  
C. THE UNITED KINGDOM’S MI5 MODEL  
The United Kingdom’s MI5, formerly known as the Secret Service Bureau, was 
established in 1909. From its modest beginnings, it grew into an effective and professional 
intelligence agency. MI5 has played a vital role in the intelligence cycle during historical 
events such as World War II, the Cold War, and recent terrorist events.103 MI5’s roles and 
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responsibilities are outlined in the United Kingdom’s Security Service Act of 1989, which 
identifies three essential functions:  
1. To protect national security against threats from espionage, terrorism and 
sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers, and from actions 
intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, 
industrial or violent means; 
2. To safeguard the economic well-being of the UK against threats posed by 
the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Isles; and 
3. To act in support of the activities of the police forces and other law 
enforcement agencies in the prevention and detection of serious crime. 
However, since the establishment of the Serious Organised Crime Agency 
and subsequently the National Crime Agency, MI5 has suspended work on 
serious crime in order to concentrate more resources on counter 
terrorism.104 
The first two functions are similar to the FBI’s mission to protect the country from 
terrorism and foreign powers. However, the third function is an example of how each U.S. 
intelligence center is responsible for providing intelligence products to address threats 
within their jurisdictions. 
Unlike local, state, and tribal law enforcement, MI5 has no arrest powers; rather, it 
collects information, produces intelligence products, and provides those products to law 
enforcement agencies. In return, the law enforcement agencies use the information to 
initiate parallel investigations. MI5 officers are unarmed and rarely participate in any 
criminal proceedings, but they fulfill the essential role of collecting, analyzing, and 
disseminating actionable intelligence to law enforcement decision-makers. As explored in 
Chapter II, unlike the MI5 model, the NMASIC is not a recognized investigative 
component and is dependent on other agencies for the collection of information. This 
practice limits the NMASIC’s capability as an intelligence center, requiring the center to 
rely on contributing agencies.  
MI5’s intelligence cycle has changed over the years and adapted to terrorist 
techniques, tactics, and procedures. This transformation became more relevant and 
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valuable following the London bombings of July 7, 2005, when the United Kingdom faced 
a new homegrown terrorist threat.105 The United Kingdom’s intelligence cycle is similar 
to the United States’; as explained by Paul Smith, however, the UK model consists of only 
four elements: requirements, collection, analysis, and action (see Figure 6).106 The MI5’s 
intelligence cycle appears to be more simplistic and efficient for applying tactical 
intelligence to crime and terrorism. MI5’s intelligence cycle excludes the dissemination 
component as seen in the U.S. model. MI5 has determined that dissemination alone is not 
actionable; dissemination requires law enforcement personnel to use the produced 
intelligence through either covert or overt operations. A few examples of MI5’s covert 
operations include the use of eavesdropping/technical coverage, surveillance, 
interceptions, and human intelligence.107 Meanwhile, overt operations may consist of 
financial warnings, checkpoints, arrests, and the use of the public.108 The application of 
overt and covert actions allows intelligence and investigative components to be aggressive 
and reassures that the produced intelligence is effectively used.  
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Figure 6. UK MI5 Intelligence Cycle109 
MI-5 uses a unique operational concept known as the desk officer system. The role 
of a desk officer is similar to that of the U.S. fusion center’s intelligence analyst, with an 
emphasis on collecting and disseminating intelligence, assessing threats, and collaborating 
with and advising other agencies to address threats.110 However, unlike U.S. intelligence 
analysts, desk officers aggressively investigate individuals or groups.111 An investigative 
expert, the desk officer has the overall understanding needed to determine the level of threat 
an individual or group presents.112 Also, the United Kingdom’s law enforcement and 
intelligence communities provide the desk officer with all intelligence related to their 
targets. According to Smith, MI5 and the law enforcement agency participate in a dual-
track investigation: MI5 operates as an intelligence component and the law enforcement 
agency conducts the traditional investigation. At the time of arrest, the desk officer lends 
interview advice to the police and evaluates collected information and intelligence to 
identify additional threats.113  
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The most significant difference between the U.S. intelligence cycle and MI5’s 
process is that the U.S. model contains six components while the MI5 process contains 
only four, and results in an aggressive response. In MI5, investigators collect information 
and analysts validate and analyze the data to further investigative efforts. Moreover, this 
streamlined process expedites investigative efforts by allowing law enforcement to apply 
targeting intelligence operations to combat criminal organizations and rapidly respond to 
criminal activity. However, one benefit of the U.S. intelligence cycle is that it provides 
leadership with strategic options to prepare for future threats and to adapt to crime trends.  
The U.S. intelligence liaison officer program and MI5’s desk officer system both 
have their roles within the intelligence function. However, the desk officer concept fulfills 
more of an investigative support role; the MI5’s dual-track process, which differs from the 
U.S. liaison officer programs (which are primarily used for information collection and 
information sharing), enhances investigative efforts by paralleling ongoing investigations 
and trusting analytical personnel with maintaining all information. This may explain why 
Smith brags that when “colleagues from across the globe, in law enforcement and 
intelligence, look to the United Kingdom as a model[,] many of them are, quite frankly, 
envious.”114   
The following chapter examines the use of intelligence-led policing and highlights 
the best practices from local U.S. intelligence centers, which include the El Paso, Texas, 
Multi-Agency Tactical Response Information Exchange, New Jersey Regional Operations 
and Intelligence Center, and the Santa Fe Police Department Intelligence Center. An 
intelligence function in each organization is examined to illuminate best practices that 
could be used in the NMASIC.  
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IV. U.S. LOCAL INTELLIGENCE BEST PRACTICES  
This chapter evaluates the similarities, differences, and best practices between two 
U.S. local intelligence centers: the El Paso, Texas, Police Department’s Multi-Agency 
Tactical Response Information Exchange (MATRIX) and the New Jersey Regional 
Operations and Intelligence Center (ROIC). It also evaluates how each intelligence center 
operates and supports stakeholders within its area of responsibility, with an understanding 
that the core of most intelligence centers today consists of state and local law enforcement 
and criminal intelligence.115 The final section of the chapter examines how the Santa Fe 
Police Department has applied best practices from other local intelligence centers to 
address crime within its jurisdiction.  
A. EL PASO MULTI-AGENCY TACTICAL RESPONSE INFORMATION 
EXCHANGE  
With a 450-mile radius and population of 2.7 million, El Paso, Texas, is the largest 
metropolitan area on the U.S.–Mexican border. El Paso is surrounded, as well, with a 
regional population of approximately 17.8 million, covering New Mexico, western Texas, 
eastern Arizona, and northern Mexico.116 The city has justifiably allocated resources to 
ensure the safety of its constituents and critical infrastructure.117 To fulfill this 
commitment, the El Paso Police Department created MATRIX, whose mission is to “serve 
as an all-crimes/all hazards tactical information and intelligence hub for the El Paso Police 
Department and Participating Agencies.”118 In developing MATRIX, the department’s 
objective was to facilitate more effective and efficient use of sworn law enforcement 
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personnel and resources, and collect information for local criminal investigations.119 The 
El Paso Police Department focuses primarily on local crime; the fusion center therefore 
created a counterterrorism capability to share information with other state fusion 
centers.120 This simultaneously provides a framework for maximizing resources to address 
local crime, which could be shared with other fusion centers.  
Like the rest of the country’s fusion centers, the primary function of MATRIX 
involves information sharing and intelligence-led policing. MATRIX’s goal is to “provide 
support and direction through information and intelligence analysis for law enforcement in 
order to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of investigations.”121 This process 
allows the police department to analyze crime threats in its jurisdiction while maximizing 
its personnel for identifying threats and crime. Furthermore, the collected and analyzed 
information may be shared with other agencies in the region, allowing several 
organizations to collectively target crime.  
MATRIX capitalizes on four critical capabilities: gathering local information, 
receiving classified and unclassified information from federal partners, analyzing local 
implications and threats, and disseminating threat information to government organizations 
and private sector partners. El Paso’s unique geographic location allows for all levels of 
government to benefit from the analyzed data, which may include drug cartel activity, 
illegal immigration, or threats of terrorism.  
MATRIX also implements a watch process, which helps to “prevent, reduce, and 
disrupt crime and terrorism through the early warning of all-crimes, all-hazards, and all-
threats.”122 According to the El Paso Police Department, “The Watch is the eyes and ears 
of the Fusion Center; the most critical operational element within the center.”123 The 
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personnel assigned to the watch assist with emergency responses to critical incidents and 
investigations and are tasked with the following responsibilities:  
1. Maintaining situation awareness of events locally and throughout the 
world;  
2. Completing time-sensitive requests from our vetted partners; and,  
3. Coordinating the dissemination of information, as delineated in this 
document.124 
The watch process enhances the police department’s situational awareness regarding local 
and global threats that may affect its jurisdiction. The combination of real-time intelligence 
for local and regional needs with situational awareness of national and global events creates 
a dome of knowledge for understanding all threats and all hazards.  
Using local personnel for information gathering allows leadership to understand the 
issues and threats occurring within their jurisdiction. However, the ability to receive 
classified and unclassified information from federal partners is also vital to both the local 
and national perspective. MATRIX supports the foundational elements of the “National 
Strategy for Information Sharing,” which focuses on “improving the information sharing 
of homeland security, terrorism, law enforcement information related to terrorism, within 
and among all levels of governments and the private sector.”125 Access to the 
government’s most sensitive, controlled, and restricted information is essential for local 
law enforcement to have a clear understanding of all threats affecting their jurisdiction.  
MATRIX collaborates with the El Paso Joint Operations and Intelligence Center to 
analyze and disseminate information “on current crime trends and patterns and establish 
forecasts or predictions of future crimes.”126 Furthermore, MATRIX employs two 
functional concepts for sharing information: 
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• Define Requirements: Identify and prioritize analytic production 
requirements, information needs, and corresponding gathering and 
reporting efforts, and; 
• Inform Decision-makers: Provide appropriate information to inform 
leadership on tactical, operational, and strategic decisions to mitigate 
threats.127 
These concepts, as part of the intelligence cycle, are designed to efficiently help decision-
makers understand their options.  
Finally, MATRIX plays an important role in the intelligence community and the 
mission of homeland security by providing actionable intelligence to state, local, and 
private sector partners. The El Paso Police Department recognizes that information sharing 
allows the department to  
• Provide local context to a given threat report originating from the Federal 
Government;  
• Provide operational and tactical guidance in the form of recommendations; 
and  
• Archive threat information for future review and analysis.128 
Through this practice, the El Paso Police Department makes its contribution to the 
information sharing process and sustains an all-hazards model. The flow of local raw data 
to the intelligence community allows the federal government to transition from a 50,000-
foot view to the frontline perspective for a clearer understanding of the issues affecting 
local jurisdictions. 
B. NEW JERSEY REGIONAL OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE 
CENTER  
In 2005, the New Jersey State Police’s criminal investigations branch was 
researching options for increasing its efficiency and effectiveness; at the time, only a few 
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personnel had been tasked with collecting and sharing intelligence.129 In 2006, the 
department opened the Regional Operations and Intelligence Center (ROIC). In addition 
to the newly developed fusion center, the department developed the “Practical Guide to 
Intelligence-Led Policing,” which is “currently being integrated within the State Police to 
create a mission capable force in an ‘all crimes, all hazards, and all threat’ 
environment.”130 The New Jersey State Police intelligence effort has four main 
components:  
1. The reorganization of the investigations division for the rapid deployment 
of intelligence and investigative assets  
2. The implementation of the intelligence cycle process  
3. The formation of a Regional Operations and Intelligence Center to provide 
tactical analysis and situational awareness;  
4. and the use of strategic planning and intelligence-driven analyses to set 
priorities and allocate resources.131 
Realigning an organization is tedious and requires thorough planning. In doing so, the New 
Jersey State Police relied on a five-stage process to ensure success: 
1. An architectural realignment of the organization to remove barriers and 
promote intelligence and information exchange. 
2. A cultural shift to embrace intelligence-led policing philosophies and 
practices. 
3. The re-tooling of the distribution and management of the Statewide 
Intelligence Management System (SIMS).  
4. The creation of a “fusion center,” known as the Regional Operations and 
Intelligence Center. 
5. The implementation of regional accountability plans for managing 
intelligence and enforcement operations related to organized criminal 
activities.132 
                                                 





The department had to cautiously overcome concerns from the public and 
leadership that an intelligence-led policing model would take away from traditional 
community policing efforts. Before 9/11, the state police, and other local law enforcement 
agencies, primarily followed a community-policing designed to build relationships with 
the community, address community problems, and enhance the quality of life for all 
citizens.133 However, after the 9/11, the 9/11 Commission criticized local law enforcement 
and the intelligence community for failing to share information.134 To fill this intelligence 
gap, law enforcement organizations collaborated to collect and share information: a 
policing model that has become known as intelligence-led policing. On July 30, 2007, 
Chief Mark A. Marshall from the Smithfield, Virginia, Police Department, perhaps said it 
best:  
Naturally, there have been repeated calls for federal authorities to 
coordinate, develop, and implement a solution. Given the nature and context 
of policing in the U.S. however, “a federal ‘top-down’ answer would not be 
effective. It is local and state law enforcement that provides the majority of 
law enforcement service in this country. It is the local, tribal, county and 
state agencies that capture and retain the vast majority of data from which 
‘nuggets of information’ can be mined to protect our homeland.”135  
Although state fusion centers and federal law enforcement may be the collectors—and 
sharers—of information, local and state law enforcement are at the tip of the spear in 
addressing crime and terrorism. Arguably, the homeland security mission would be 
insufficient without the involvement of local and state law enforcement.  
The New Jersey State Police deploys overt and covert operations to collect 
information. As defined by Carter, covert action is “influencing events and behavior in 
other states or groups without revealing one’s involvement.”136 Examples of covert 
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operations include the use of undercover personnel, surveillance, eavesdropping, wiretaps, 
jail recordings, global positioning devices, and cell phone analysis. However, overt 
operations, which are obvious investigative methods, use the “collection of intelligence 
openly without concealment”—for example, a police detective publicly executing a search 
warrant on a suspect’s vehicle.137 This application of information collection is more 
effective than the traditional fusion center process of relying on other agencies and open-
source data. This research has determined that both overt and covert applications are 
effective tools utilized by local intelligence centers and regional organizations such as MI5.  
The ROIC’s three intelligence-led functions are watch operations, analysis, and 
asset management.138 As highlighted by Fuentes, “During daily operations, these 
functions are performed to create a complete picture of the current operating environment 
throughout the state of New Jersey, including external factors that may also present 
immediate concerns as well as the resources available to address them.”139 Figure 7 depicts 
the ROIC’s functions.  
 
Figure 7. ROIC’s Three Intelligence-Led Policing Functions140 
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Watch operations are coordinated with the intelligence analyst to provide the fifty-foot-
view concept for the jurisdiction, and to help officers receive and respond to alerts.141 The 
analyst, in turn, provides tactical and operational intelligence for the department as a whole, 
along with its partners. Meanwhile, the asset management section is responsible for 
maintaining awareness of all department and partner assets “for the purpose of coordinated 
response to threats and incidents.”142 Together, these three functions provide situational 
awareness of potential threats, analytical ability to address emerging threats, and the ability 
to deploy resources during an emergency. During an interview, Colonel Fuentes explained 
how the ROIC plays an essential role in intelligence-led policing, which he calls a useful 
information collection and analysis tool, adding, “The ROIC has successfully blended 
information and analysis to produce intelligence for the good of the state, not just on 
homeland security/terrorism levels, but also along the lines of traffic control, anti-gang 
initiatives and community policing.”143 The ROIC is a perfect example of how local law 
enforcement can incorporate intelligence-led policing while also maintaining community-
policing initiatives. The best practices from the ROIC and recommendations identified in 
the New Jersey State Police’s “Practical Guide to Intelligence-Led Policing” are used for 
analysis in the following case study. 
C. CASE STUDY: SANTA FE POLICE DEPARTMENT CRIMINAL 
INTELLIGENCE CENTER 
1. The Problem  
Santa Fe is the capital of and fourth largest city in New Mexico.144 Even still, from 
July 1, 2014, to July 1, 2016, its police department began to respond to newly annexed 
areas encompassing approximately 5,173.42 acres, a population of 13,891, and 4,767 
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housing units.145 Currently, the Santa Fe Police Department has approximately thirty 
vacant positions; these vacancies, combined with population growth, has created new crime 
challenges. Furthermore, the city of Santa Fe has been unable to track organized crime 
trends beyond the jurisdiction, has lacked technological solutions to effectively target 
emerging crime trends, and, most importantly, has non-existent regional information 
sharing with other local, state, and tribal law enforcement organizations. In 2017, the 
department’s command staff sought a modern tactic to supplement the traditional policing 
efforts to address the increase in crime. 
2. The Plan 
In February 2017, the Santa Fe Police Department decided to evaluate the 
effectiveness of its criminal investigations division and identify best practices from other 
agencies to maximize available resources. As a result, the department’s intelligence-led 
policing project developed the following objectives:  
• Reorganize criminal investigations to close information and intelligence 
gaps 
• Implement technological solutions, to include social media monitoring, 
access capabilities to public school surveillance cameras, video 
enhancement software, person and business search databases, covert 
surveillance cameras, etc.  
• Implement targeting capabilities for identifying, disrupting, and 
dismantling criminal organizations 
• Create a privacy policy and intelligence guidelines as required by 28 CFR 
Part 23, with clear procedures for implementation and training for all 
criminal investigations division personnel 
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• Aggressively pursue information collection capabilities and share 
actionable intelligence products with investigative personnel 
• Establish a rapid intelligence component to support traditional 
investigative efforts146 
The command staff determined that the rapid deployment of intelligence was key to 
targeting/responding to threats. In rapid intelligence, sworn investigative personnel 
assigned to the criminal intelligence unit are tasked with paralleling the traditional criminal 
investigation approach—for example, they may analyze social media or gather information 
from cell phone towers. 
The Santa Fe Police Department reorganization involved three tasks. First, the 
department needed to find a location to facilitate information sharing between multiple 
intelligence personnel—the location had to house an intelligence officer, multiple 
detectives with criminal intelligence responsibilities, and several wall monitors and 
workstations. Second, to enhance intelligence knowledge and expertise, all assigned 
personnel attended intelligence courses provided by the Department of Homeland Security 
and other accredited training organizations. Finally, to facilitate information sharing among 
agencies within the region, the department held an opening ceremony for all local, state, 
and tribal law enforcement agencies to display the intelligence center’s technological 
capabilities. Like many rural and tribal police departments around the country, these 
agencies have limited personnel, resources, and communications; this ceremony therefore 
stimulated interest and participation.  
3. Summary  
As a result of the reorganization, the Santa Fe Police department was able to close 
information and intelligence gaps, establish proficient technological solutions, and enhance 
                                                 
146 Matthew Champlin, Jimmie Montoya, David Webb, and Steve Cosban, “Criminal Investigations 
Division SWOT Analysis” (retrieved via personal communication, City of Santa Fe Police Department, 
June 13, 2018). 
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information sharing with regional law enforcement organizations. For instance, the 
department was able to: 
• Disrupt a Mexican drug cartel trafficking organization 
• Solve of a series of robberies committed by a violent juvenile gang 
• Provide intelligence support during Special Weapons And Tactics 
(SWAT) operations  
• Provide surveillance systems to city public schools  
• Advanced its cell phone analysis capabilities 
• Enhance its video and digital media applications  
D. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  
Although each of the three reviewed intelligence centers—El Paso’s MATRIX, 
New Jersey’s Regional Operations Center, and the Santa Fe Police Department—shares 
information with local partners, maintains intelligence functions, operates under a 
hierarchy, and incorporates best practices, they are not all the same. This chapter highlights 
how important it is for intelligence centers to adjust their missions to support the other law 
enforcement organizations in their areas.  
MATRIX and the ROIC take on an independent role to address an operational gap 
with already established resources. Rather than soliciting additional resources, the 
organizations simply realigned their investigative personnel to fulfill an intelligence role. 
Both centers identify the importance of the intelligence cycle to address local crime trends 
but also remain committed to the homeland security mission of information sharing with 
all levels of government. 
Watch operations—seen in all three centers—provide real-time, open-source 
information that has been historically untouched during day-to-day law enforcement 
operations. A watch center provides situational awareness not only to intelligence 
personnel, but also to command staff tasked with making life-saving/life-taking decisions. 
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For example, the Santa Fe Police Department’s intelligence center is not a 24/7 watch 
center like those in MATRIX or the ROIC; however, it is activated during high-risk 
incidents such SWAT deployment and follows a four-phase, high-risk operation process: 
first, the personnel pre-plan for high-risk operations by collecting all information on 
targeted individuals and their associates, as well as information about the identified 
location. Next, they deploy covert operations, such as activating the target’s cell phone to 
track his or her GPS movement, or deploying covert surveillance cameras to actively 
monitor the activity at the targeted location. Third, during the operation itself, intelligence 
personnel aggressively monitor surveillance cameras to provide real-time information to 
the SWAT commander about changes and potential threats. Finally, once the operation is 
complete, intelligence personnel debrief anyone who was arrested, provide access to the 
scene for investigation, and analyze all seized electronic devices. In return, all analyzed 
information is given to investigative personnel highlighting incriminating content and 
identifying additional individuals who could be targeted for their criminal involvement.  
Another similarity between MATRIX and the ROIC is their use of analysis and 
technology. Both provide intelligence support for investigations, threat assessments, 
intelligence reports and briefings, crime analysis, and critical infrastructure threat analysis. 
New Jersey and El Paso each have unique infrastructure requirements that, in turn, require 
unique risk assessment and expertise. MATRIX and the ROIC identified the importance 
for decision makers to quickly utilize resources to address any potential threats to its critical 
infrastructure and link any potential threats to a criminal element.  
The key argument of this research is that investigative and criminal analytical 
capability—as seen with MATRIX and the ROIC—does not exist within the NMASIC. 
The ROIC and MATRIX realigned investigative personnel, along with other personnel, to 
enhance intelligence capabilities. In developing the Santa Fe Police Department 
intelligence center, command staff mirrored the best practices identified in MATRIX and 
the ROIC and followed suit, realigning investigative personnel to establish an efficient 
intelligence function. Furthermore, in today’s modern policing, the intelligence function 
requires technological applications and software for the collection of information. For 
example, the Santa Fe Police Department intelligence center prioritized its technology and 
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software for the analysis of social media, surveillance video, other open-source data, cell 
phones, and cell towers. Understanding the importance of information collection, the 
department command staff solicited funds to purchase and deploy cell phone analysis 
software to its personnel assigned to the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Task Force. 
Now, SFPD intelligence personnel are obtaining valuable information from cell phones 
seized from individuals involved in drug trafficking.  
The ROIC and MATRIX also successfully manage resources. In the event of a 
public safety crisis, critical incident, or terrorist attack, both intelligence centers are fully 
capable of quickly identifying, tracking, and deploying the necessary resources for the 
unfolding event. Some of these resources may include armored vehicles, hazardous 
material equipment, or other emergency equipment stored in key locations.  
In conclusion, although modern intelligence centers have taken on an all-hazards 
approach, the essential function of fusion centers involves the tactical and strategic analysis 
of crime. Moreover, this research has proven the importance of fusion centers breaking 
away from the status quo and adapting to modern policing tactics. The next, and final, 
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V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION  
This research project embarked with a few preconceived notions and 
expectations—primarily, that an intelligence-led policing model was not a function of an 
intelligence fusion center and that intelligence fusion centers were designed specifically to 
share information regarding threats of terrorism. This research has shown, however, that 
several fusion centers have maintained the primary mission of combating terrorism while 
still broadening their focus to address all crimes or all-hazards.  
In Chapter II, this thesis examined the New Mexico intelligence system and its 
challenges. Chapter III highlighted key intelligence functions as recommended by the 
Department of Justice and other experts, including a review of liaison officer programs and 
the United Kingdom’s MI5 intelligence model. Chapter IV provided an analysis of U.S. 
local intelligence best practices, looking specifically at the El Paso Multi-Agency Tactical 
Response Information Exchange, the New Jersey Regional Operations and Intelligence 
Center, and the Santa Fe Police Department’s Criminal Intelligence and Analysis Center. 
Finally, this chapter identifies key lessons learned and provides the following 
recommendations for New Mexico:  
1. Realign the NMASIC to fall within the authority of NMSP 
2. Implement a hybrid intelligence cycle to support the local, state, tribal, and 
federal missions 
3. Restructure the intelligence liaison officer program and apply the desk 
officer concept in each of NMSP’s twelve districts 
4. Pursue future research on the implementation of an intelligence center for 
the United States’ twelve tribal regions 
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A. RECOMMENDATION #1: REALIGNING THE NMASIC  
Although this recommendation may lead to political controversy, the NMASIC 
must be realigned under the NMSP if the state wants to serve its unique and diverse 
population effectively. This research has shown that the current state intelligence center 
cannot collect and share valuable information among local, state, tribal, and federal 
organizations. The common theme in this research is that information sharing is the heart 
of intelligence—a vital function New Mexico currently lacks.  
Shifting NMASIC personnel to NMSP gives them full access to law enforcement–
sensitive information and would provide intelligence support for ongoing operations. As 
explained in Chapter IV, the HSIN database has not been effective; although it is essential 
for the sharing of NMASIC core line products, it does not provide the tactical analysis 
needed for local, state, and tribal law enforcement operations—which is essential for 
situational awareness and threat assessment. Although the HSIN is an important tool, 
access to the NMSP Criminal Justice Information System database is also needed to limit 
intelligence gaps in rural and tribal communities.  
Moving NMASIC under the NMSP will also improve the center’s emergency 
response capability. New Mexico’s law enforcement routinely addresses critical incidents 
such as SWAT team deployments, covert and overt operations, high-risk operations, and 
incidents affecting New Mexico’s arterial roadways. Adopting a watch concept like that of 
other centers would allow NMASIC to take advantage of rapid intelligence resources 
staged at NMSP’s three regional communications centers.  
Finally, a realignment would increase NMSP’s networking and coverage within the 
state and national arena. NMSP supports the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force full time and 
coordinates state involvement within the task force. Also, NMSP assists tribal governments 
through the application of “cross deputization agreements,” which allows NMSP personnel 
to enter tribal territory to collect and share valuable information about ongoing 
investigations. No other New Mexico law enforcement or DHSEM has this unique 
authority.  
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B. RECOMMENDATION #2: HYBRID INTELLIGENCE CYCLE  
The intelligence cycle is the underlining framework for any intelligence center. 
However, effective intelligence centers tend to modify their intelligence cycles to serve the 
needs of the organizations within their area of responsibility. Along these lines, the 
NMASIC should incorporate a hybrid intelligence cycle to facilitate the information 
collection and sharing efforts of all stakeholders. Figure 8 is a diagram of the proposed 
hybrid intelligence cycle.  
 
Figure 8. Hybrid Intelligence Cycle Process 
This proposed model allows leadership to maintain strategic analysis and 
forecasting capabilities to address all hazards and threats, as depicted in the outer layer of 
the intelligence cycle, while also supporting the tactical intelligence function for first 
responders and investigative operations, defined within the core of the hybrid intelligence 
cycle. This core allows law enforcement to apply targeting intelligence operations to 
combat criminal organizations and rapidly respond to criminal activity. The hybrid model 
blends tactical and strategic analysis, which allows local, state, and tribal law enforcement 
to engage in day-to-day operations by identifying individual targets and groups while 
simultaneously collecting information to contribute to the national information sharing 
initiative.  
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C. RECOMMENDATION #3: INTELLIGENCE LIAISON OFFICER 
PROGRAM AND THE DESK OFFICER CONCEPT 
It is difficult for fusion centers to establish and maintain direct contact with several 
jurisdictions. Like many state fusion centers, the NMASIC developed its ILO program to 
facilitate the information-sharing process.147 Transitioning the NMASIC to the NMSP 
allows the ILO program to expand on its current local, state, and tribal partners.  
As previously mentioned, the NMASIC has had trouble recruiting rural and tribal 
law enforcement due to staffing shortages, which inhibits the continuity of the program. 
However, if NMSP intelligence and analysis staff in each of the twelve districts were 
realligned into desk officer roles (like in the UK model) the department could provide 
support and organizational outreach to rural and tribal law enforcement agencies. The role 
of a desk officer is much like the role of an intelligence analyst, with an emphasis on 
collecting and disseminating information, assessing threats, collaborating with other 
agencies, and advising.148 However, unlike U.S. intelligence analysts, desk officers are 
aggressive investigators.149 A desk officer system allows intelligence officers to work in 
concert with the officers who are conducting a traditional investigation. Such a system 
would further allow NMSP to collect vital information from rural and tribal communities 
to proactively target criminal organizations around the state.  
D. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Further research should focus on the creation of intelligence centers equivalent to 
state fusion centers for the twelve tribal regions in the United States. For example, the 
Navajo Region, which is policed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, covers Utah, Colorado, 
a majority of Arizona, and New Mexico. The Bureau of Indian Affairs provides traditional 
law enforcement services, including patrol, criminal investigations, and community-
oriented policing. However, no intelligence component supports the Navajo Region or 
                                                 
147 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, Establishing a Fusion Center 
Liaison Officer Program. 
148 Smith, “Counter-Terrorism in the UK.” 
149 Smith. 
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connects any of the twelve tribal regions. Identifying an avenue for the creation of an 
intelligence center in each of these regions would not only enhance local, state, and federal 
organizations’ information collection and sharing initiatives but would also provide a 
pathway for tribal communities to participate in and benefit from the information-sharing 
process.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Research and practice show that intelligence fusion centers should conform to law 
enforcement needs, particularly intelligence-led policing. Intelligence-led policing is no 
longer a concept confined to urban policing; rural and tribal communities could benefit 
from the practice as well. To develop a robust intelligence-led policing model for the state 
and its rural and tribal communities, New Mexico must adopt an all-hazards approach for 
the information sharing process. The reorganization of the NMASIC will enhance the New 
Mexico network, which is essential for leveraging resources to detect and disrupt organized 
criminal organizations and terrorism. With a redefined NMASIC mission, all participating 
agencies will have a universal intelligence-led policing definition, maintain and enhance 
community-policing efforts, and establish a platform for contribution to the domestic 
intelligence cycle, essentially fusing New Mexico’s four-corner region. 
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